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TRADE CREDIT AND TAXES
Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and James R. Hines Jr.*
Abstract—This paper analyzes the extent to which tax differences affect
the use of trade credit. U.S.-owned affiliates in low-tax countries use trade
credit to lend, whereas those in high-tax countries use trade credit to borrow: 10% lower local tax rates are associated with net trade credit positions that are 1.4% higher as a fraction of sales. The use of trade credit to
get capital out of low-tax, low-return environments is also illustrated by
the temporary repatriation tax holiday in 2005, which was used most
intensively by affiliates with positive net trade credit positions.

I.

Introduction

B

USINESS transactions are commonly conducted on the
basis of credit, as a result of which a seller does not
receive cash but instead the promise of a future payment,
which it records as an account receivable, and a buyer
incurs an obligation, which it records as an account payable.
At a given time, firms will have both accounts receivable
and accounts payable, which collectively are known as
trade credit. The U.S. corporate sector reported aggregate
accounts receivable of $13.0 trillion and accounts payable
of $5.3 trillion at year-end 2011, which are sizable figures
even relative to its annual business receipts of $28.3 trillion
and net income of $1.3 trillion.1
This paper examines the extent to which taxation influences trade credit practices by affecting returns to investment. High rates of taxation generally increase the cost of
capital, reducing investment levels and driving up pretax
returns. As a result, tax rate differences create incentives to
transfer capital from low-tax, low-capital-cost, low-return
users to high-tax, high-capital-cost, high-return users by
delaying or accelerating the payment of trade accounts. The
evidence suggests that tax-induced borrowing and lending
through trade accounts is of similar magnitude to tax effects
on borrowing and lending through conventional bond issuance and bank loans.
The effects of taxation on the use of trade credit are most
readily observed internationally, where tax rate differences
are sizable and apparent. Foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms make extensive use of trade credit: at year-end
2004, these affiliates held accounts receivable of $1.49 trilReceived for publication April 6, 2013. Revision accepted for publication January 5, 2015. Editor: Gordon Hanson.
* Desai: Harvard University and NBER; Foley: Harvard University and
NBER; Hines: University of Michigan and NBER.
The statistical analysis of firm-level data on U.S. multinational companies was conducted at the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department
of Commerce under arrangements that maintain legal confidentiality
requirements. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not
reflect official positions of the U.S. Department of Commerce. We thank
seminar participants at Columbia Law School, Harvard Law School,
Oxford University, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, the
University of Michigan, the UNC Tax Symposium, and ITPF for helpful
comments. Gordon Hanson and three anonymous referees offered many
constructive suggestions that are incorporated in this draft. C.F. and M.D.
thank the Division of Research of the Harvard Business School for financial support.
1
These data are drawn from 2011 corporate tax returns, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11coccr.pdf.

lion and had accounts payable of $1.39 trillion; each of
these exceeded 30% of total annual affiliate sales. The analysis of detailed affiliate-level data suggests that tax effects
are large and statistically significant in explaining trade
credit choices.
Figure 1 offers descriptive evidence, drawn from published BEA data, of the extent to which tax incentives may
influence the use of trade credit by multinational affiliates.
The figure presents information on the foreign affiliates of
U.S. multinational firms sorted by tax rates in their host foreign countries. The figure shows that accounts receivable
and accounts payable, as well as differences between the
two, are greater in low-tax jurisdictions than in high-tax jurisdictions, a pattern that is consistent with incentives to use
trade credit to allocate capital to places where it generates
high pretax returns.
Regressions using parent company fixed effects confirm
that affiliates in high-tax countries have smaller net working
capital positions than do other affiliates; higher tax rates are
associated with greater borrowing through trade accounts
that is similar in magnitude to the additional nontrade
account borrowing commonly associated with higher tax
rates. The association of tax rate differences and net working capital positions is strongest for wholly owned affiliates
and those with fewer idiosyncratic capital needs as indicated by low capital expenditures.
Responses to recent changes in U.S. international tax policy offer additional evidence of the use of trade credit to
reallocate capital to more productive uses. The 2004 U.S.
Homeland Investment Act greatly lowered the cost of reallocating capital to the United States by permitting many
firms to pay U.S. tax on only 15% of the dividends they
received from foreign affiliates during 2005. Foreign affiliates with positive net working capital positions prior to
2005 responded to the tax change by paying greater dividends to their parent companies and reducing their holdings
of working capital more sharply than did other affiliates.
These reactions are consistent with pre-2005 use of trade
credit to reallocate capital to locations where it earns higher
returns and the emergence in 2005 of a more permanent
and cost-effective method of doing so.
Existing work emphasizes explanations for the use of
trade credit that are unrelated to taxes. Several papers,
including Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), Giannetti, Burkart,
and Ellingsen (2011), Cunat (2007), and Fabbri and Menichini (2010), highlight the ability of suppliers to lend in a
way that limits managerial opportunism more effectively
than can financial lenders. Other studies, such as Lee and
Stowe (1993), Long, Malitz, and Ravid (1993), Ng, Smith,
and Smith (1999), and Antràs and Foley (2015), explain
how trade credit arrangements solve information problems
concerning product quality and buyer credit-worthiness.
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TRADE CREDIT AND TAXES
FIGURE 1.—TAX RATES AND TRADE CREDIT

revenue until cash is actually received. Brennan, Maksimovic, and Zechner (1988) also consider the tax treatment of
installment sales, but conclude that they do not reduce the
present value of tax liabilities. Under IRS rules, if sellers
defer income recognition, then buyers are unable to claim
tax deductions for expenses until payment is actually made.
Furthermore, the special tax treatment of installment sales
is available only in certain circumstances involving sales
of capital assets; it is not available for the vast majority of
corporate sales, including sales of inventory property and
services.2
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II.

Understanding the Impact of Taxes on Trade Credit

0
0%-15% Tax Rate 15%-30% Tax Rate 30%-45% Tax Rate
Accounts Receivable/Sales
Net Working Capital/Sales

45%+ Tax Rate

Accounts Payable/Sales

This figure displays mean measures of trade credit use by foreign affiliates of U.S. firms in countries
with differing corporate tax rates. Accounts receivable/sales is the ratio of total current accounts receivable to total annual sales; accounts payable/sales is the ratio of total current accounts payable to total
sales; and net working capital/sales is the ratio of the difference between total current accounts receivable and current accounts payable to total sales. Ratios are computed using the publicly available BEA
country-level data for the 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004 benchmark years that cover nonbank majority-owned affiliates of nonbank parents. Average tax rates are calculated as ratios of total income tax
payments to total pretax income. The left-most set of bars depicts ratios for U.S. multinaitonal affiliates
located in countries with average corporate tax rates below 15%. The second set of bars depicts ratios for
U.S. multinational affiliates located in countries with tax rates greater than or equal to 15% and less than
30%. The third set of bars depicts ratios for U.S. multinational affiliates located in countries with tax
rates greater than or equal to 30% and less than 45%, and the right-most set of bars depicts ratios for
U.S. multinational affiliates located in countries with tax rates greater than or equal to 45%.

Relatedly, Petersen and Rajan (1994) present evidence that
monitoring provided by suppliers might aid firms in accessing financial lenders, who can free-ride on the monitoring
provided by suppliers. Trade credit decisions also appear to
reflect the bargaining power of buyers and suppliers, as
indicated by Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2012). Fisman
and Love (2003), and Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende
(2007), identify some of the consequences of access to trade
credit. Meltzer (1960) and Ramey (1992) explain trade
credit as a means of reallocating capital across firms,
though the motives for this reallocation are unrelated to
taxes. Of course, these different explanations for the use of
trade credit, and explanations related to tax incentives, are
not mutually exclusive.
A few studies consider tax motivations for the use of
trade credit. Brick and Fung (1984) consider the implications of a cash accounting regime, in which transactions are
taxed when payments are made. In such a setting, heavily
taxed firms have incentives to extend credit to lightly taxed
firms, thereby deferring receipt of cash and the recognition
of tax liabilities. Most corporations, however, including all
publicly traded corporations, are required to use accrual
accounting for tax purposes. Under accrual accounting, a
firm must pay tax on income as it accrues, so is taxed on the
proceeds of a completed sale even when cash is not yet
received. Mian and Smith (1992) note that heavily taxed
sellers might be able to defer tax liabilities by using installment sales that are permitted under IRS rules and allow taxpayers using accrual accounting to defer recognizing sales

Two corporations that buy and sell items from each other
can pay at the time of purchase or at another time, in the
meantime creating, respectively, accounts payable and
accounts receivable. Corporations are required to use the
accrual method in calculating their tax liabilities, so income
is taxable when it is earned, not necessarily when it is
received. Consequently, a corporation must pay income
taxes on sales to another party even if it has not yet received
payment, as long as the sale has taken place and the buying
party can reasonably be expected to make that payment
eventually.
Consider a setting in which firm i, which could be a U.S.
multinational parent company, purchases a good worth $1
from firm j, which could be a foreign affiliate of that parent,
at the start of a year and faces the question of whether to
pay immediately. If firm i delays payment, it accrues an
account payable that it will settle at the start of the following year with interest r, so next year it pays (1 þ r). As a
result of not paying this year, firm i has the use of an additional dollar of capital for the year, thus increasing its financial capital Ki, and firm j forgoes the use of the same dollar
of capital, thus decreasing Kj. Denote firm i’s production
function by Qi(Ki); the delayed payment then nets firm i
after taxes:
½Q0 i ðKi Þ  rð1  si Þ;

(1)

in which ti is the tax rate facing firm i. Expression (1)
reflects both that the additional income is taxable and
that firm i is entitled to deduct from taxable income the
interest component of its settlement of the account payable
to firm j. Similarly, firm j loses the benefit of using $1 of
financial capital for a year but receives interest, so after
taxes, it nets



(2)
r  Q 0 j Kj 1  s j :
Expressions (1) and (2) can be viewed as participation
constraints in which both parties have incentives to use
trade credit if Q0i ðKi Þ  r  Q0j Kj . By delaying payment,
2
Graetz and Schenk (2009) review the interpretation and application of
U.S. tax law to corporate accounts receivable and accounts payable.
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firm i effectively borrows from firm j and benefits from this
trade due to a difference in pretax marginal products of
capital. If the pattern of pretax marginal
 products of capital
were reversed, so that Q0i ðKi Þ < Q0j Kj and r lies between
them, then firm j is a more productive user of capital than
firm i, and both can benefit by having firm i prepay for its
purchase.
The advantage of using trade credit is manifest by summing expressions (1) and (2) to obtain the joint benefit generated by the contemplated delayed payment:



Q0i ðKi Þð1  si Þ  Q0j Kj 1  sj þ r si  sj :

(3)

The joint benefit consists of the difference between the
after-tax marginal products of capital, as given by the first
two terms of expression (3), and the tax-advantaged location of interest payments and receipts, as given by the third
term. If after-tax marginal products of capital are equal, an
implication of equity-financed investment with a common
cost of capital,3 then the first two terms offset each other
and there is a gain to the transaction if si > sj .4 All other
considerations equal, larger tax rate differences induce
greater reallocations of capital. Trade credit, just like debt,
reduces the distortion to investment levels created by the
corporate tax by encouraging firms to reallocate investment
to higher tax locations.
Instead of employing trade credit arrangements, customers might exchange cash for goods at the time of sale,
financing their expenditures, if need be, with loans from
local banks. Bank loans serve many of the same functions as
trade credit, though terms and conditions of bank loans are
likely to differ from trade terms offered by suppliers because
banks and suppliers have different relationships with buyers
and access to different information, and they can draw on
3
The assumption of equity finance is a common starting place in the
analysis of the effect of corporate taxation, since if corporate investment
is instead debt financed, then there is effectively no corporate tax: a firm
that is 100% debt financed, with an average return on investment equal to
the interest rate, has interest deductions that exactly offset its taxable
income, leaving zero corporate tax to be paid (Auerbach, 2002). The evidence that high tax rates discourage investment, together with the hundreds of billions of dollars collected by the U.S. corporate tax each year,
suggests that in practice, corporations are not entirely debt financed. Hassett and Hubbard (2002), Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999), Desai and
Goolsbee (2004), Djankov et al. (2010), Da Rin, Giacomo, and Sembenelli (2011), and Bond and Xing (2010) offer evidence of the impact of
corporate tax rates on investment. Graham (2000) measures the extent to
which firms borrow too little from a tax standpoint; he estimates that the
average firm in his sample could double its debt-related tax benefits by
taking on additional debt.
4
The third term of expression (4) corresponds to the net value of interest tax deductions in the high-tax jurisdiction and taxes on interest income
in the low-tax jurisdiction, reflecting that trade credit reallocates capital
in a manner that is treated for tax purposes like borrowing. Since higher
tax rates are consistently associated with greater propensity to use debt
finance (Graham, 1996; Desai, Foley, & Hines, 2004b; Huizinga, Laeven,
& Nicodème, 2008), it follows that firms facing high corporate tax rates
should be expected to borrow using trade credit, whereas those facing low
corporate tax rates should be expected to use trade credit to loan to other
firms.

differing expertise. In practice, information and enforcement costs limit the availability of inexpensive bank loans
and trade credit borrowing, and tax rules can restrict the
extent of deductible interest payments. As a result, trade
credit is often an attractive method of borrowing.
III.

Evidence from U.S. Multinational Firms

Data used to analyze the financing and operations of U.S.
firms are drawn from the BEA annual survey of U.S. direct
investment abroad. Although many data items, such as
sales, are collected for a broad sample on an annual basis,
detailed data on trade credit are available for larger affiliates only in 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004, years in
which BEA conducted benchmark surveys. In these years,
surveys captured information on current trade accounts and
trade notes receivable, as well as current trade accounts and
trade notes payable.5 In the analysis that follows, these
measures are scaled by sales.6 Net trade credit positions are
measured in the data as differences between accounts receivable and accounts payable scaled by sales.
Data on foreign income taxes paid and net income can be
used to calculate foreign corporate income tax rates; each
affiliate’s average tax rate is the ratio of foreign income tax
payments to the sum of net income and foreign income tax
payments. Countries are then assigned tax rates equal to
median tax rates among local U.S. affiliates. This tax burden measure has the disadvantage of being partly a function
of the average behavior of U.S. investors but offers the
advantage of reflecting not only statutory corporate tax rates
but also the values of tax depreciation and other business
deductions, tax credits, tax holidays, and other features of
national tax systems that can significantly influence tax
obligations; as a result, it is widely employed by studies of
U.S. multinationals (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2001, 2004a,
2004b, 2006; Blouin et al., 2014) that use the BEA data.7
The BEA data include information on parent company
ownership of affiliates; this information is used to identify
the directly owned affiliates whose dividend payments were
affected by the 2005 repatriation tax holiday. Precise measures of accounts receivable and accounts payable are not
available in the BEA data on an annual basis, but a broader
5

In 1982, 1989, and 1994, all affiliates with an absolute value of sales,
assets, or net income in excess of $3 million, $15 million, and $50 million, respectively, were required to report accounts receivable and
accounts payable. In 1999 and 2004, all majority-owned affiliates with an
absolute value of sales, assets, or net income in excess of $100 million
and $150 million, respectively, were required to report accounts receivable and accounts payable.
6
To reduce the potential impact of outliers, accounts receivable/sales,
accounts payable/sales, and net working capital/sales are winsorized at
the 2.5% level in each tail of the distribution.
7
The regressions presented in tables 2 and 3 were rerun using three
additional tax rate measures: statutory corporate tax rates, average tax
rates faced by U.S. affiliates as reported in the BEA data, and (affiliatespecific) average tax rates faced by U.S. firms other than the affiliate
whose behavior the regression model predicts. Estimated tax effects in
the regressions using these alternative measures, available from the
authors, look similar to those reported in tables 2 and 3.

TRADE CREDIT AND TAXES
TABLE 1.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Statistics for table 2
Net Working Capital/Sales
Median Country Tax Rate
Haven Dummy
Log of Assets
Non Trade Account Leverage
Log of GDP per Capita
Whole Ownership Dummy
Statistics for table 3
Dividends/Sales
Directly Owned with Positive Net
Working Capital
Net Income/Sales
Net Working Capital Ratio
Log of Assets
Log of GDP per Capita

Mean

Standard Deviation

0.0433
0.3357
0.1334
10.6473
0.2823
9.2287
0.7783

0.5044
0.1333
0.3401
1.8786
0.2958
1.0386
0.4154

0.0316
0.2513

0.0820
0.4338

0.0648
0.0231
12.6659
9.8820

0.4292
0.5264
1.3412
1.0337

This table presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis presented in the
subsequent tables. Net Working Capital/Sales is the ratio of the difference between current accounts
receivable and current accounts payable to sales. Median Country Tax Rate is the median value of the
ratio of affiliate income tax payments to pretax income in the affiliate’s host country. Haven Dummy
equals 1 for foreign affiliates located in countries identified as tax havens by Hines and Rice (1994). Log
of Assets is the log of total affiliate assets, and Non Trade Account Leverage is the ratio of the difference
between current liabilities and long-term debt and current trade accounts payable to sales. Log of GDP
Per Capita is the log of per capita GDP of the country in which an affiliate is located. Whole Ownership
Dummy is a dummy equal to 1 for affiliates that are wholly owned by their U.S. parent companies. Dividends/sales is the ratio of affiliate dividend payments to total affiliate sales. Directly owned with positive
net working capital is a dummy equal to 1 for affiliates that are directly owned by their U.S. parent companies and have current accounts receivable that exceed current accounts payable in 2004. Net income/
sales is the ratio of net income to sales. Net working capital ratio is a ratio that is available on an annual
basis; the numerator is equal to current assets minus current liabilities and long-term debt and the
denominator is equal to the sum of current assets, current liabilities, and long-term debt.

measure is available annually for the years 1999 to 2007:
the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities and longterm debt to current assets plus current liabilities and longterm debt. This measure of working capital is not scaled by
sales. The broader measures of assets and liabilities on
which the ratio is based do not relate closely to sales and
scaling the difference in the numerator by sales yields many
outliers. By scaling the difference in the numerator by the
sum of its components, the measure is restricted to lie
between 1 and 1. Table 1 presents means and standard
deviations of variables used in the regressions that follow.
Table 2 presents regressions that explore the impact of
local tax rates on trade credit use by U.S. multinational
affiliates in foreign countries between 1982 and 2004. The
dependent variable in the regressions presented in table 2 is
the ratio of net working capital to affiliate sales. All of the
regressions presented in table 2 include parent company
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Specifications also control for the log of affiliate assets, the log of country GDP
per capita, and nontrade account leverage, which is measured as current liabilities and long-term debt less current
trade accounts payable, scaled by sales. The 0.1430 coefficient in column 1 suggests that 10% lower tax rates are
associated with net working capital positions that are 1.4%
greater as a fraction of sales.
The regression presented in column 2 analyzes differences between affiliates located in foreign jurisdictions
identified as tax havens by Hines and Rice (1994) and affiliates located elsewhere. U.S. multinational firms commonly
use affiliates located in tax havens to facilitate indirect own-
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ership of other foreign affiliates and to serve as intermediaries in trade between related parties.8 The 0.0660 coefficient in column 2 of table 2 indicates that tax haven
affiliates have significantly larger net working capital positions than do affiliates located elsewhere, the difference
corresponding to 6.6% of sales.
The evidence in table 2 indicates that there is greater
trade account borrowing in high-tax locations. Multinational firms commonly also do more nontrade account borrowing in high-tax locations than in low-tax locations,
reflecting the benefits of interest expense deductions in
high-tax environments. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004b)
find that in the BEA data, 10% higher foreign tax rates are
associated with nontrade account borrowing by foreign
affiliates of U.S. multinational firms that is 1.6% higher as a
fraction of assets;9 since the mean ratio of nontrade account
borrowing to assets in that sample is 0.35, this is a difference equal to 4.7% of average borrowing. Since the
0.1430 coefficient in column 1 of table 2 implies that
10% higher tax rates are associated with 1.4% greater net
borrowing through trade accounts as a fraction of sales, and
table 1 indicates that mean nontrade account borrowing as a
fraction of sales is 0.28, it follows that the tax effect on net
working capital equals 5.1% of nontrade account borrowing. This is roughly equal in magnitude to the effect of tax
rate differences on more conventional borrowing other than
through trade accounts.
The use of trade credit to reallocate capital in response to
tax incentives is likely to be most easily facilitated when
these entities are under common control, so interacting an
indicator of whole ownership with tax variables offers the
prospect of identifying the extent to which higher levels of
control precipitate observed tax effects. Furthermore, affiliates that face what appear to be highly attractive investment
opportunities are unlikely to prefer to extend large amounts
of trade credit, regardless of local tax rates, given the potential to earn high returns in local investments. While it is not
possible to identify directly the quality of an affiliate’s perceived investment opportunities, the affiliate’s investment
behavior offers an indirect, albeit endogenous, indicator.
Column 3 presents estimated coefficients from a regression that includes a dummy variable for wholly owned
affiliates and an interaction of this dummy variable and the
local tax rate; the regression is otherwise identical to that
reported in column 1. The 0.1012 coefficient suggests that
wholly owned affiliates in low-tax countries have much larger working capital positions than do wholly owned affili8
Tax haven affiliates account for 13.4% of total affiliate sales in the
sample; the ratio of aggregate tax haven affiliate account receivables to
aggregate sales is 29.3%, and the ratio of aggregate tax haven affiliate
account payables to aggregate sales is 23.5%, the difference reflecting the
use of trade accounts to do net lending from these locations. By contrast,
the ratio of aggregate account receivables to aggregate sales is 32.3% for
affiliates other than those in tax havens, and their ratio of aggregate
account payables to aggregate sales is 32.1%.
9
The magnitude of the estimated tax effect is typical of those reported
elsewhere in the literature; see, for example, Huizinga et al. (2008).
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TABLE 2.—TAXES AND NET WORKING CAPITAL POSITIONS

Dependent Variable

Constant
Median Country Tax Rate

Net Working Capital/Sales
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.1409
(0.0610)**
0.1430
(0.0495)***

0.1248
(0.0557)**

0.1848
(0.0652)***
0.0538
(0.0426)

0.1382
(0.0550)**

0.0461
(0.0584)
0.1940
(0.0603)***

Haven Dummy

0.0660
(0.0229)***

Whole Ownership Dummy

0.0650
(0.0246)***

0.0140
(0.0202)
0.0218
(0.0073)***

Median Country Tax Rate  Whole Ownership Dummy

0.1762
(0.0541)***

Haven Dummy  Whole Ownership Dummy

0.0866
(0.0319)***

Haven Dummy  High Capex Dummy

Non Trade Account Leverage
Log of GDP per Capita
Parent fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?
Number of observations
R2

0.0558
(0.0061)***

0.1012
(0.0588)*

Median Country Tax Rate  High Capex Dummy

Log of Assets

0.0814
(0.0549)
0.0779
(0.0282)***

0.1277
(0.0219)***

High Capex Dummy

(6)

0.0027
(0.0036)
0.2489
(0.0196)***
0.0161
(0.0043)***
Yes
Yes
37,693
0.1583

0.0028
(0.0034)
0.2508
(0.0193)***
0.0103
(0.0043)**
Yes
Yes
37,711
0.1591

0.0030
(0.0036)
0.2488
(0.0195)***
0.0142
(0.0042)***
Yes
Yes
37,693
0.1588

0.0029
(0.0034)
0.2510
(0.0192)***
0.0094
(0.0042)**
Yes
Yes
37,711
0.1597

0.0038
(0.0036)
0.2514
(0.0194)***
0.0100
(0.0042)**
Yes
Yes
37,693
0.1620

0.0709
(0.0261)***
0.0038
(0.0032)
0.2533
(0.0192)***
0.0070
(0.0043)
Yes
Yes
37,711
0.1624

This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining the net working capital of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms in 1982, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004. The dependent variable is the ratio
of the difference between current accounts receivable and current accounts payable to sales. Median Country Tax Rate is the median value of the ratio of affiliate income tax payments to pretax income in the affiliate’s host country. Haven Dummy equals 1 for foreign affiliates located in countries identified as tax havens by Hines and Rice (1994). Whole Ownership Dummy is a dummy equal to 1 for affiliates wholly owned
by their U.S. parent companies. High Capital Expenditure Dummy is a dummy equal to 1 for observations in which the ratio of affiliate capital expenditures to affiliate assets exceeds the sample median. Log of
Assets is the log of total affiliate assets, and Non Trade Account Leverage is the ratio of the difference between current liabilities and long-term debt and current trade accounts payable to sales. Log of GDP Per
Capita is the log of per capita GDP of the country in which an affiliate is located. All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares and include fixed effects for each parent firm and for each year. Standard errors
that correct for clustering of errors by country are presented in parentheses. Asterisks denote two-tailed significance levels: significant at *90%, **95%, ***99%.

ates elsewhere, though this tax effect is statistically significant only at the 10% level. It is noteworthy that the
0.0538 coefficient on the uninteracted tax rate is quite
small and statistically insignificant, implying that tax rate
differences have little discernible effect on working capital
positions of partially owned affiliates. The regression
reported in column 4 uses a tax haven dummy variable in
place of the local tax rate, the 0.0866 coefficient indicating
that wholly owned affiliates in tax havens have net working
capital positions that are 8.6% larger as a fraction of sales
than those elsewhere.
The regressions presented in columns 5 and 6 of table 2
use an indicator of investment opportunities to explore the
net working capital implications of the interaction between
tax incentives and investment opportunities. The regression
reported in column 5 includes a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if an affiliate’s capital expenditure-to-asset ratio
lies above the sample median; the dummy variable is 0
otherwise. As indicated by the 0.1277 coefficient in column 5, affiliates with above-median capital expenditure to
asset ratios have substantially smaller net working positions, reflecting some combination of their demand for, and
availability of, investible funds. The 0.1940 coefficient in
column 5 indicates that affiliates in low-tax countries have
much higher net working capital positions than do affiliates

in high-tax countries, but the 0.1762 coefficient reveals that
this tax correlation entirely disappears among affiliates with
significant capital expenditures. Hence, it appears that tax
rate differences are much more strongly associated with net
working capital differences among firms without extensive
demand for capital expenditures.
A similar pattern appears in the regression reported in
column 6, in which the capital expenditure dummy variable
is interacted with a dummy for tax haven location. The
0.0779 coefficient on tax haven location indicates that affiliates in tax havens have significantly larger net working
capital accounts than do affiliates located elsewhere, and
the 0.0709 coefficient on the interaction reveals that this
effect again disappears for affiliates with significant capital
expenditures.
Firms without attractive foreign investment opportunities, but with foreign profits that would be subject to high
rates of U.S. tax if repatriated, had the strongest incentives
to use trade credit arrangements to reallocate capital from
foreign affiliates prior to the 2005 repatriation tax holiday.
Figure 2 depicts aggregate dividend payout ratios for two
samples of foreign affiliates of U.S. firms in 2004 and 2005:
the left two bars represent directly owned affiliates that had
positive net working capital positions in 2004, and the right
two bars represent all others. The shaded bars present
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FIGURE 2.—WORKING CAPITAL AND DIVIDEND REPATRIATIONS
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This figure displays aggregate dividend payout ratios for two groups of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms in 2004 and in 2005. Dividend payout ratios are ratios of aggregate dividends paid by U.S.
multinational affiliates to aggregate net income of U.S. multinational affiliates. The two left-most bars
depict dividend payout ratios of foreign affiliates that are directly owned by U.S parent companies and
have positive net working capital positions in 2004. The two right-most bars depict dividend payout
ratios of other affiliates. The shaded bars present 2004 dividend payout ratios, and the unshaded bars present 2005 dividend payout ratios.

aggregate payout ratios for 2004, and the unshaded bars
present payout ratios for 2005. This figure indicates that
affiliates with positive net working capital positions prior to
the tax change increased their dividend payout ratios much
more than did other affiliates, suggesting that they had been
using trade credit to reallocate capital previously trapped
abroad.
The regressions presented in columns 1 and 2 of table 3
evaluate the extent to which foreign affiliates with positive
net working capital positions prior to 2005 took advantage
of the repatriation tax holiday to remit dividends to U.S.
parent companies. For this purpose, it is necessary to focus
on foreign affiliates directly owned by their U.S. parent
companies because dividend payments by indirectly owned
affiliates would be received by entities other than U.S. parent companies and therefore possibly not included among
2005 repatriations eligible for the tax holiday.
The dependent variable in the regressions reported in columns 1 and 2 of table 3 is the ratio of dividends to affiliate
sales. The independent variable Directly Owned with Positive Net Working Capital is a dummy equal to 1 for affiliates that are directly owned and have accounts receivable
exceeding accounts payable in 2004. The 0.0124 coefficient
on the interaction of this variable with a dummy for year
2005 in the regression reported in column 1 indicates that
directly owned affiliates with positive net working capital
positions were more likely to pay dividends during 2005
than in other years; these affiliates were indeed more likely
to pay dividends in 2005 than are typical affiliates in typical
years, as reflected by the positive sum of the 0.0062 and
0.0124 coefficients. The regression reported in column 1
controls for ratios of net income to sales, whether the affiliate paid a dividend in the previous year, year effects, and
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parent fixed effects The specification in column 2 includes
affiliate fixed effects instead of parent fixed effects, without
changing significantly the estimated effect of the 2005 repatriation holiday.
By offering a one-time low-cost means of moving capital
out of low-tax jurisdictions, the Homeland Investment Act
reduced the incentive for affiliates to use net working capital positions for this purpose. The regressions presented in
columns 3 and 4 of table 3 test the hypothesis that affiliates
in low-tax jurisdictions reduced their net working capital
positions in response to the 2005 holiday. The dependent
variable is the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities and long-term debt to current assets plus current liabilities and long-term debt. The tax measure is a dummy equal
to 1 for affiliates based in countries with tax rates in the bottom quartile of rates prior to the holiday.
The 0.0764 coefficient on the dummy for affiliates based
in low-tax countries in column 3 indicates that these affiliates tend to have higher working capital positions than do
other affiliates. The 0.0345 coefficient on the interaction
of this dummy and the dummy for the years 2005, 2006,
and 2007 indicates that these affiliates reduced their working capital positions relative to other affiliates immediately
following the tax holiday. The specification in column 4
includes affiliate fixed effects, with an estimated coefficient
on the interaction of low tax rates and years 2005 to 2007
that is similar to that reported in column 3.
IV.

Conclusion

U.S. multinational firms use trade credit to reallocate capital between locations with differing tax rates, reflecting that
some of the benefits of direct ownership of foreign operations lie in opportunities for tax-motivated planning (Desai
et al. 2004a). Incentives to use trade credit to reallocate capital also appear in settings with trade between unrelated parties. Petersen and Rajan (1997) note that lower-income
firms, despite their limited liquidity and high monitoring
costs, are more likely than others to lend to unrelated parties
via trade credit. One reason may be that lower-income firms,
with their greater likelihood of tax losses, in expectation face
lower marginal tax rates than others and might therefore find
it profitable to use trade credit to reallocate capital to firms
with higher tax rates and higher pretax marginal products of
capital.
High tax rates encourage borrowing through trade
accounts just as high tax rates encourage more conventional
forms of borrowing such as bank loans and debt issuance.
The evidence in this paper suggests that the additional trade
account borrowing associated with higher tax rates is similar in magnitude to the additional conventional borrowing
associated with higher tax rates. Concerns over high tax
rates encouraging excessive corporate borrowing, with
resulting prospects for bankruptcy, are commonly directed
at conventional borrowing rather than borrowing through
trade accounts, as are remedies such as thin capitalization
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TABLE 3.—TAX HOLIDAY AND REPATRIATIONS
Dependent Variable

Dividends/Sales

Constant
Directly Owned with Positive Net Working Capital
Directly Owned with Positive Net Working Capital  2005 Dummy
Net Income/Sales
Lag Dividend/Sales

Net Working Capital Ratio

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.0309
(0.0019)***
0.0062
(0.0018)***
0.0124
(0.0038)***
0.0318
(0.0026)***
0.3269
(0.0166)***

0.0452
(0.0022)***

0.7500
(0.0599)***

Low Median Country Tax Rate Dummy  2005–2007 Dummy
Log of Assets
Log of GDP per Capita
Yes
No
Yes
17,764
0.2319

0.3081
(0.2445)

0.0107
(0.0045)**
0.0199
(0.0038)***
0.0376
(0.0173)**

Low Median Country Tax Rate Dummy

Parent fixed effects?
Affiliate fixed effects?
Year fixed effects?
Number of observations
R2

(4)

No
Yes
Yes
17,764
0.4812

0.0764
(0.0123)***
0.0345
(0.0149)**
0.0452
(0.0036)***
0.0116
(0.0046)**
Yes
No
Yes
49,009
0.1980

0.0403
(0.0152)***
0.0297
(0.0078)***
0.0145
(0.0232)
No
Yes
Yes
49,009
0.6876

The dependent variable in the regressions reported in columns 1 and 2 is the ratio of affiliate dividend payments to sales. Directly Owned with Positive Net Working Capital is a dummy equal to 1 for affiliates that
are directly owned by their U.S. parent companies and have current accounts receivable that exceed current accounts payable in 2004. The 2005 Dummy is equal to 1 for observations in 2005. Net Income/Sales is
the ratio of net income to sales. Lag Dividend/Sales is the previous year’s ratio of affiliate dividend payments to annual sales. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is a ratio; the numerator is equal to current
assets minus current liabilities and long-term debt, and the denominator is equal to the sum of current assets, current liabilities, and long-term debt. Low Median Country Tax Rate Dummy is a dummy equal to 1 for
affiliates based in countries in the lowest quartile when ranked by the median value of the ratio of affiliate income tax payments to pretax income, averaged over the 1999–2004 period. 2005–2007 Dummy is a
dummy equal to 1 in the years 2005, 2006, and 2007. Log of Assets is the log of total affiliate assets, and Log of GDP Per Capita is the log of per capita GDP of the country in which an affiliate is located. All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares and include year fixed effects. Regressions reported in columns 1 and 3 include parent firm fixed effects, and the regressions reported in columns 2 and 4 include affiliate
fixed effects. Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by affiliate are presented in parentheses. Asterisks denote two-tailed significance levels: significant at *90%, **95%, ***99%.

rules (Buettner et al., 2012; Blouin et al., 2014). The magnitude of trade account borrowing, and its evident responsiveness to taxation, suggests that this may represent too narrow
a view of corporate activity.
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